Page 7 of 8~120 min topic

Multi-agent in code

Set release boundaries for the research-critique coordinator

Page 7 defines what the research+critique coordinator must refuse before release—security here is not a pasted happy path.

~15 min this pageSafety and operations

1Learn the idea

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Threats for this artifact only

Operational risks for the research+critique coordinator center on critique worker receiving secrets from research scratchpad logs, plus the earlier failure mode (workers sharing mutable state, or coordinator ignoring critique veto). Safety lives in executable gates, allowlists, redaction, and a named owner—not in a warning paragraph under an unsafe function.

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Run the release gate

function authorize(ctx: Context, action: Action) {
  if (!ctx.permissions.has(action.permission)) {
    throw new SafeError("forbidden");
  }
  if (action.risk === "write" && !ctx.approvalToken) {
    throw new SafeError("approval_required");
  }
}

Expected evidence: Research returns two sourced claims; critique rejects one unsupported claim; synthesis keeps one.. A failed assertion means stop, investigate, and do not publish the research-critique coordinator.

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Owner, retention, rollback

Name who can disable the feature, what data is retained, and how to roll back to the last known good artifact. Pin the reviewed configuration (versions, thresholds, allowlists) so “what shipped” is reconstructable for multi-agent-in-code.

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Lab notebook: release blocker

Write the release blocker as a predicate, not a feeling: “Do not ship the research-critique coordinator if critique worker receiving secrets from research scratchpad logs.” Pair it with a passing control that shows the reviewed configuration still works for two workers with separate step budgets. Name an owner and a rollback handle (git tag, docs_version, previous image).

Security pages must not paste the happy-path demo. If your gate code looks like the implementation page, replace it with a deny/allow check aimed at critique worker receiving secrets from research scratchpad logs.

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Worked judgment

State the data retention rule in one line (what is stored, for how long, who can read it). Then state the kill switch (env flag, config pin, or feature owner). The research-critique coordinator is not shippable without both, even when veto rate; unsupported claim count after merge; total step budget looks healthy.

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Why this stage matters for the research-critique coordinator

At the safety and operations stage for multi-agent-in-code, the job is narrower than finishing a product demo. You are creating one progressive evidence piece about two workers with separate step budgets that later pages inherit without redefining success. Keep that fixture small enough to inspect by hand, keep outputs copy-pasteable as text, and refuse to narrate this baseline as if it were a production SLA: single agent without critique pass.

For this page specifically, success looks like an executable deny gate for the lab-specific threat while still centering the user decision to delegate research and critique to two bounded workers, then merge under a coordinator policy. If you cannot point to a file, command, or assertion that proves that for the research-critique coordinator, stay on this page instead of advancing.

Glossary: tool · Glossary: structured output · Cheatsheet: production ops signals

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Before you start

Why this matters

Write an attack or unsafe misuse specific to this lab: critique worker receiving secrets from research scratchpad logs. Predict whether your current code blocks it. Then run the gate below and compare.

In the wild

See how this idea shows up as a product and a company — then come back to the lesson. Skills transfer across vendors.

Check your understanding

Page assessment

Answer from memory. Completion is saved from this evidence, not from opening the next page.

1. Is there a concrete release blocker for: critique worker receiving secrets from research scratchpad logs?
2. Are retention and rollback rules explicit?
3. Can the reviewed version be identified after release?
4. Did this page use a security-specific check—not the happy-path demo?

All responses are required.