Page 7 of 8~245 min topic

Health check lab

Secure health checks operations

Least privilege, negative probes, and a timed rollback beat a security essay about Kubernetes liveness vs readiness for retrieval-and-generation API.

~25 min this pageSecurity and ops

1Learn the idea

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Least privilege for this lab

Separate runtime and operator roles for Kubernetes liveness vs readiness for retrieval-and-generation API. Runtime may only perform the narrow actions that cluster operator during vector DB maintenance window needs; operators get audited break-glass with TTL. Encode a negative probe that denies the privilege trick related to readyz embedded in liveness → restart storm during dependency blip.

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Data and secret hygiene

Redact prompts/PII at collection. Secrets enter via a manager or workload identity — never source, fixtures, or exception strings. Incident PROBE-RESTART-STORM-8 should be impossible if these controls hold. Output allowlists and schema checks stay in force on error paths.

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Implementation artifact

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probes use loopback or internal auth; do not expose dependency credentials in probe errors

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Rollback drill

Rehearse the rollback or kill switch timed against a clock. Record actor, reason, prior revision/secret/flag, and verification query. Invariant reminder: /livez only checks process; /readyz checks vector+model deps; wrong probe kills healthy pods.

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Stage depth

Abuse cases unique to this lab include the privilege path implied by readyz embedded in liveness → restart storm during dependency blip. Prove a read-only role cannot mutate. Break-glass tokens expire; leftover tokens fail the drill. Dependency pin/digest story matters when images or models move under you. Document how to rotate the credential that Kubernetes liveness vs readiness for retrieval-and-generation API uses without a full outage window longer than your dual-run plan. Security evidence is part of ship, not an appendix nobody reads.

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Field notes for `health-check-lab` / `security-ops`

List network egress destinations and justify each. Ensure debug endpoints are off by default in the shipping config. Verify that error responses do not echo secrets or raw stack frames to clients. For multi-tenant paths, add a cross-tenant probe fixture. Time the rollback drill twice — once with the author, once with a peer. Store the drill transcript beside the threat notes for the incident id. In this chapter the product is Kubernetes liveness vs readiness for retrieval-and-generation API, the human stakeholder is cluster operator during vector DB maintenance window, and the incident id you design against is PROBE-RESTART-STORM-8. Re-state the oracle in your notes — vector pause → readyz 503, livez 200, no restart loop; process deadlock → livez fails → restart — and keep the invariant visible: /livez only checks process; /readyz checks vector+model deps; wrong probe kills healthy pods. Track restart_count == 0 during dep outage and ready_pods ≥ 1 when deps healthy as the scoreboard. Surface under change control: GET /livez and GET /readyz. If you only have forty minutes, finish the fixture for readyz embedded in liveness → restart storm during dependency blip before polishing UI. Promotion language stays ternary: promote, hold, or roll back based on evidence, not hope.

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Before you start

Why this matters

Threat-model Kubernetes liveness vs readiness for retrieval-and-generation API in five minutes: who can change config, who can read secrets, what a malicious payload tries to do. Write one negative probe that must yield deny with zero side effects. Reference PROBE-RESTART-STORM-8 as the story you refuse to repeat.

Check your understanding

Page assessment

Answer from memory. Completion is saved from this evidence, not from opening the next page.

1. Does deny imply zero side effects?
2. Are secrets absent from logs?
3. Is rollback evidenced with timestamps?

All responses are required.