Page 1 of 8~245 min topic

Incident response lab

Define the production target for incident response

Ship a falsifiable slice of **correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2)** — success is INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored, not a polished screenshot.

~25 min this pageLab goal

1Try it yourself

Decision drill

Incident response desk

Contain leaks, rollback bad releases, or investigate with traces — in that priority order.

Incident control68%

1/3Logs show raw customer email in traces.

2Learn the idea

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Name the operable slice

This lab builds correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2). The human in the loop is incident commander coordinating mitigate → communicate → verify. Scope is intentionally narrower than “make AI reliable”: you will prove one oracle — INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored — and one invariant — declare early; preserve evidence; mitigation scoped; no blame in channel. Record non-goals in your notes so a later change cannot silently expand authority. The incident mnemonic for the chapter is INC-RAG-CIT-2201; design as if that ticket is already written and you are filling evidence.

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Write the acceptance contract

Turn the oracle into a table: input fixture, expected observable, prohibited side effect, owner, latency/cost ceiling. Separate model taste from software correctness — transport, auth, parsing, and termination must be deterministic even when generated text varies. Primary metric family: time_to_declare_m, time_to_mitigate_m, customer_update_sent. Averages without a denominator or revision label do not gate release. Fake external dependencies in unit tests; live calls wait until fakes pass.

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Implementation artifact

Declare: SEV2 incorrect citations on policy answers since 16:40 UTC
IC: Alex; Ops: Sam; Comms: Jordan

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Freeze the first red test

Before implementation, encode a failing check that would have caught team debugs for an hour without declaring — customers keep seeing wrong policy cites. That failure is the pedagogical north star for later pages: contracts reject it, happy path never performs it, validation asserts it, failure-handling contains it, observability detects it, security-ops prevents privilege tricks around it, and mastery replays it in a drill. Endpoint under study: POST /v1/rag/answer.

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Stage depth

Capacity note for planners: estimate peak demand on POST /v1/rag/answer and the cost ceiling for a failed retry storm. Write the abort conditions — unbounded spend, cross-tenant leakage, or inability to roll back — before you enjoy the first green test. Prefer synthetic fixtures shaped like production over anonymized production dumps you cannot share in class. When you are tempted to widen scope, re-read the oracle (INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored) and cut features that do not serve it. The teaching outcome is judgment under constraints: incident commander coordinating mitigate → communicate → verify gets a trustworthy control, not a kitchen-sink framework. Keep the language of release decisions: promote, hold, or roll back — never “see if it gets better.”

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Field notes for `incident-response-lab` / `lab-goal`

Decide what will live in version control on day one: fixtures, contract markdown, and a failing test name. Write the cost ceiling as a hard number with currency and period. If the lab involves clusters, name the non-prod context you will use and forbid prod kubecontexts in scripts. Capture the baseline metric once before changing code so later gains are comparative. Refuse tools that hide the request path behind magic macros until the oracle is green on fakes. Your README section for this page should be five lines or fewer and still falsifiable. In this chapter the product is correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2), the human stakeholder is incident commander coordinating mitigate → communicate → verify, and the incident id you design against is INC-RAG-CIT-2201. Re-state the oracle in your notes — INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored — and keep the invariant visible: declare early; preserve evidence; mitigation scoped; no blame in channel. Track time_to_declare_m, time_to_mitigate_m, customer_update_sent as the scoreboard. Surface under change control: POST /v1/rag/answer. If you only have forty minutes, finish the fixture for team debugs for an hour without declaring — customers keep seeing wrong policy cites before polishing UI. Promotion language stays ternary: promote, hold, or roll back based on evidence, not hope.

Go deeper

Before you start

Why this matters

Write the single done-definition a reviewer would accept for Incident response lab (INC-RAG-CIT-2201). Include the numeric gate hidden in this oracle: INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored. Then name the fake success you refuse: a demo that ignores team debugs for an hour without declaring — customers keep seeing wrong policy cites. Keep the sentence beside your editor; every later page should make this sentence easier to prove.

Check your understanding

Page assessment

Answer from memory. Completion is saved from this evidence, not from opening the next page.

1. Is the oracle (INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored) falsifiable from a fixture?
2. Is the invariant (declare early; preserve evidence; mitigation scoped; no blame in channel) stated without hand-waving?
3. Does the contract name INC-RAG-CIT-2201 as a risk you design against?

All responses are required.