Page 7 of 8~245 min topic

Incident response lab

Secure incident response operations

Least privilege, negative probes, and a timed rollback beat a security essay about correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2).

~25 min this pageSecurity and ops

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Least privilege for this lab

Separate runtime and operator roles for correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2). Runtime may only perform the narrow actions that incident commander coordinating mitigate → communicate → verify needs; operators get audited break-glass with TTL. Encode a negative probe that denies the privilege trick related to team debugs for an hour without declaring — customers keep seeing wrong policy cites.

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Data and secret hygiene

Redact prompts/PII at collection. Secrets enter via a manager or workload identity — never source, fixtures, or exception strings. Incident INC-RAG-CIT-2201 should be impossible if these controls hold. Output allowlists and schema checks stay in force on error paths.

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Implementation artifact

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Do not paste customer prompts into public Slack; use redacted incident doc.

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Rollback drill

Rehearse the rollback or kill switch timed against a clock. Record actor, reason, prior revision/secret/flag, and verification query. Invariant reminder: declare early; preserve evidence; mitigation scoped; no blame in channel.

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Stage depth

Abuse cases unique to this lab include the privilege path implied by team debugs for an hour without declaring — customers keep seeing wrong policy cites. Prove a read-only role cannot mutate. Break-glass tokens expire; leftover tokens fail the drill. Dependency pin/digest story matters when images or models move under you. Document how to rotate the credential that correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2) uses without a full outage window longer than your dual-run plan. Security evidence is part of ship, not an appendix nobody reads.

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Field notes for `incident-response-lab` / `security-ops`

List network egress destinations and justify each. Ensure debug endpoints are off by default in the shipping config. Verify that error responses do not echo secrets or raw stack frames to clients. For multi-tenant paths, add a cross-tenant probe fixture. Time the rollback drill twice — once with the author, once with a peer. Store the drill transcript beside the threat notes for the incident id. In this chapter the product is correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2), the human stakeholder is incident commander coordinating mitigate → communicate → verify, and the incident id you design against is INC-RAG-CIT-2201. Re-state the oracle in your notes — INC-RAG-CIT-2201: feature flag off in 8m; customer update sent; groundedness restored — and keep the invariant visible: declare early; preserve evidence; mitigation scoped; no blame in channel. Track time_to_declare_m, time_to_mitigate_m, customer_update_sent as the scoreboard. Surface under change control: POST /v1/rag/answer. If you only have forty minutes, finish the fixture for team debugs for an hour without declaring — customers keep seeing wrong policy cites before polishing UI. Promotion language stays ternary: promote, hold, or roll back based on evidence, not hope.

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Before you start

Why this matters

Threat-model correctness incident for invalid RAG citations (SEV2) in five minutes: who can change config, who can read secrets, what a malicious payload tries to do. Write one negative probe that must yield deny with zero side effects. Reference INC-RAG-CIT-2201 as the story you refuse to repeat.

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Page assessment

Answer from memory. Completion is saved from this evidence, not from opening the next page.

1. Does deny imply zero side effects?
2. Are secrets absent from logs?
3. Is rollback evidenced with timestamps?

All responses are required.