Anticipate failure modes

Realistic failures include retry storms, missing idempotency, unbounded tool loops, stale retrieval, silent model-version changes, leaked sensitive prompts, invalid structured output, weak tenant isolation, absent traces, and a fallback that violates the original safety policy.

Classify each failure as prevent, detect, contain, or recover. Prevention is strongest when a hard invariant is possible: schema validation, access control, data-split isolation, or admission limits. Detection needs an observable signal and owner. Containment limits blast radius with tenant boundaries, read-only tools, canaries, budgets, or circuit breakers. Recovery needs a tested fallback, rollback, re-index, or human queue.

Avoid a vague instruction such as “be careful.” Write a tripwire: a metric threshold, validation error, unexpected version, or forbidden action. Then state the response. If the response is “retry,” explain why the failure is transient and why retrying cannot duplicate a side effect or amplify overload.

A support-answer request gets a trace ID, retrieves three approved articles, calls a model with a JSON schema, verifies every citation, and falls back to search-only results after a 2.5-second timeout. A write action requires human approval.

The worked number is end-to-end latency ≈ 40 ms gateway + 180 ms retrieval + 1,200 ms model + 80 ms validation = 1,500 ms. State the unit and denominator whenever you report it. A percentage without a denominator can conceal a tiny sample; a latency without a percentile can conceal slow users; a similarity score without a labeled task can conceal irrelevant neighbors. Compare the observed value with a threshold chosen before seeing the final test result.

Now test the tempting shortcut. Suppose the team optimizes only the most visible metric. The result may look better while the system becomes less trustworthy. The reason is concrete: More layers improve control but add latency, cost, and operational complexity. Retries can rescue transient failures yet multiply load during an outage. A cheaper fallback preserves availability but may lower quality. Rich logs aid debugging but increase privacy exposure and storage cost. This is why the decision record must include both the intended gain and the tolerated regression. If the tolerated regression is unknown, the change is not ready for a consequential workflow.

• Prefer a measured baseline over a persuasive demo.
• Keep versions, inputs, and thresholds reproducible.
• Separate syntactic success from semantic correctness and authorization.
• Escalate or abstain when evidence falls outside the contract.
• Re-evaluate when data, traffic, models, providers, or user goals change.

These rules turn the topic into an engineering decision rather than a slogan. They also make disagreement productive: another person can challenge the assumptions, rerun the evaluation, and reach a documented conclusion.

Choose the failure with the largest combination of likelihood and impact. Inject it in a test environment without weakening production controls. Capture the first observable symptom, the alert that should fire, the component that contains the damage, and the recovery action. Then remove one safeguard and predict how the blast radius changes before running again. The lesson is not that every failure can be detected from model text. Strong designs enforce invariants outside the model and preserve enough evidence to distinguish bad input, component failure, policy refusal, and ordinary low-confidence output.